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Abstract:    Border area development is neither an original nor a brand new idea of the author.  It 
has long been discussed in a variety of words including border industries, growth triangles, growth 
areas and economic corridors.  The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation 
revitalized the border area development as a new development strategy for less developed countries 
such as Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar.    This paper examines the location advantages of border 
areas, in particular of those between less developed regions and more  developed ones.  They 
include complementary factor endowment, cross-border infrastructure services and the degree of 
economic integration and border barriers.  An  industry located in border areas has a growth 
potential, as it can exploit the location advantages of the abundant and cheap labor force in less 
developed regions, while avoiding high service link costs and unstable utility services that accrue 
from underdeveloped infrastructure in less developed regions, by utilizing cross-border 
infrastructure services  provided from more developed regions.  Special economic zones (SEZs) 
located in the border areas can effectively exploit such location advantages and contribute to the 
formation of industrial clusters in border areas. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Three economic corridors in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) are emerging as 
a multi-country transport artery across mainland Southeast Asia.  The economic 
corridor approach was first discussed in the GMS programs in late 1998 as a key means 
of further developing cooperation in the GMS (ADB, 2001: xi).  Three major routes 
were identified namely, North-South Economic Corridor, East-West Economic Corridor 
and South-South Economic Corridor.  The infrastructure development of these 
economic corridors has steadily progressed.  The North-South Economic Corridor can 
connect Kunming to Bangkok if the remaining parts of Lao PDR and Myanmar are 
completed.  The  East-West Economic Corridor can connect almost all parts of the 
route except the Myanmar part of approximately 165 km long.  Some logistics 
companies have already started commercial transport services through these economic 
corridors.  For example, Dragon Logistics Co., Ltd., a Japanese-affiliated company, 
started its cross-border transport services for the route from Bangkok to Hanoi across 
the second Mekong Bridge connecting Mukdaharn in Thailand and Savannakhet in Lao 
PDR, taking four days.  It also provides further transport services from Hanoi to 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong via Pingxiang-Lansong’s Vietnam-China border gate. 
These two routes cover the four countries in the GMS. 
However, the economic benefits arising from enhanced transport connectivity in the 
GMS may not be equally enjoyed by all the member countries, regions and cities.    For 
example, increased cross-border traffic between Bangkok and Hanoi utilizing the 
East-West Economic Corridor may just pass through Lao PDR without bringing any 
meaningful economic benefit to this landlocked country.  On the contrary, the 2 
 
increased traffic may become a burden on the Lao government due to the incurred road 
maintenance costs.  Moreover, small and medium cities and towns may also face the 
possibility of being marginalized under the more integrated regional economy. 
How to make the most of economic corridors for the overall economic development 
of  GMS countries remains an important task and challenge, particularly for least 
developed economies in the region, i.e., Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar.  The 
master plans of economic corridors included the so-called nodes development for 
industrial clusters as one of the effective measures for this purpose (See ADB’s master 
plan, 2001).  GMS countries, less developed regions in particular, will be able to tap 
the spillover effects of economic corridors into the rest of their economies through such 
nodes of industrial clusters. 
Candidates of locations for nodes development include metropolitan cities such as 
national capitals, transport hubs and gateways such as sea ports and road and railway 
junctions, and border areas in the master plan.  It seems natural that metropolitan cities 
including national capitals and transport hubs and gateways are selected as candidate 
locations for potential nodes for industrial clusters.  However, why are border areas 
and/or towns selected as potential nodes of industrial clusters? What are the specific 
location advantages of border areas for industrial clusters? These are not self-evident. 
Nevertheless, some GMS countries have already started to develop industrial 
clusters in the border areas.  For example, the Cambodian government approved 18 
special economic zones (SEZs) in the nation as of November 2007, and many of them 
are  located along the border areas.  Why  do both policy makers and private 
entrepreneurs pay attention to border area development? What are the competitive edges 
and location advantages of border areas? This paper tries to investigate the source of 3 
 
competitiveness of border areas as industrial locations.  Moreover, the author considers 
how to utilize such competitive edges of border areas for the overall development of 
less developed economies, i.e. CLM, rather than the relatively developed ones such as 
Thailand and China. 
The first section examines the concept of border area development from a historical 
viewpoint.  Border area development has long been discussed in various words such as 
border industry and growth triangles.  The GMS Economic Cooperation successfully 
revitalized such development and cooperation schemes in the 1990s, following the end 
of the Cold War.  The  second  section examines the competitive edges of border 
industry from three viewpoints, i.e., complementary factor endowment, cross-border 
infrastructure services and a balance between economic integration and border barriers. 
The  third  section provides two case studies of border industry: one is the garment 
industry in the Thai-Myanmar border areas and the other is the SEZs in Cambodia.  
The fourth section considers how to promote border industry on less developed regions 
rather  than on more developed regions.  In the last section, we summarize the 
discussion and mention policy recommendations. 
 
 
2.    Border Area Development: New Wine in Old Bottles 
 
Border area development is neither an original nor a brand new idea of the author.  
It has long been discussed in a variety of words including border industries, growth 
triangles, growth areas and economic corridors.  They have different schemes and 
programs with diverse objectives.  For example, Mexican border industrialization had 4 
 
often been discussed in the context of creating an economic fence that is expected to 
absorb the potential migrants from Mexico to the Unites States (Rivera-Batiz, 1986: 
263). South Africa tried to promote border industries to reduce overconcentration in 
metropolitan areas (Best, 1971: 329-330).  In these examples, border area development 
serves more political and social objectives than economic ones. 
On the contrary, growth triangles were conceptualized and proposed as a growth 
strategy of transnational regions.  Growth triangles are probably most well-known 
sub-regional economic cooperation schemes including border area development.  The 
term of growth triangle came into common use when then Deputy Prime Minister of 
Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, used it in December 1989 (Min Tang and Myo Thant, 1994: 
2).  They are defined as transnational economic zones spread over well-defined, 
geographical proximate areas covering three or more countries such as 
Batam-Bintang-Karimn Growth Triangle, Southern China Growth Triangle, the Tunmen 
River Area Development Programme, Northern ASEAN Growth Triangle and Eastern 
ASEAN Growth Triangle.    Growth triangles typically include the market economy and 
transitional economies that proceed from planning one to market-oriented one. 
Just before the end of the Cold War, CLMV countries also started to transform their 
socialist planning economies to market-oriented ones with open-door policy.  The 
GMS Economic Cooperation, initiated by the ADB, grasped such an opportunity in the 
early 1990s and successfully revitalized a sub-regional economic cooperation in 
mainland Southeast Asia. 
In the GMS, Thailand occupied the central part of the sub-region and recorded a 
relatively high economic and industrial growth.  When CLMV countries opened the 
door to the regional markets, they had no option but to integrate themselves with the 5 
 
Thai economy.  During the Cold War period, the cross-border economic activities 
between Thailand and CLMV countries and China had long been strictly restricted 
except for cross-border trades, which were often informal and illegal.    After the end of 
the Cold War, however, the cross-border economic activities have become activated and 
border industry has begun to grow to form industrial clusters in border areas. 
The GMS Economic Cooperation strongly promoted the regional integration 
between the CLMV economies and the Thai economy and later the Chinese one, and 
this was the key element of this regional cooperation schemes.  Whatever the 
designations are, border area development has long been discussed in this region by 
policymakers, economists and businessmen.  Border area development has recently 









  is one of the most important components of border area 
development.  What factors promote or hinder border industry? There are three factors 
that influence the competitiveness of border industry, i.e., complementary factor 
endowment, availability of cross-border infrastructure, and balance between economic 
integration and border barriers. 
 
                                                   
1  Border industry here is simply defined as industries located in border areas of two or more 
countries.  This section is mainly drawn from Kudo and Kuroiwa (2009, forthcoming). 6 
 
3.1.   Complementary Factor Endowment 
From an economic point of view, a border is nothing but an impediment to free 
mobility of productive inputs, such as labor, capital, technology and information.    As a 
result, a border creates differences in factor prices across the border, and complementary 
inputs become available alongside each other in border areas.  Such complementary 
inputs can be easily transported across the border and combined for production on either 
side of the border.  A border industry can grow by exploiting the differences in the 
endowment of productive inputs across the border. 
In the GMS, Thailand and China are relatively advanced economies, while CLM are 
still in their rudimentary development stage.    On the other hand, Vietnam is apparently 
entering a more advanced  stage of economic development.  Border areas between 
relatively advanced and less developed economies offer their respective complementary 
location advantages.  For example, CLM economies provide a labor force, while 
Thailand offers major inputs (materials, parts, and components), technology, and capital. 
In border areas, those complementary resources, which exist side by side across borders, 
are combined to produce cost-competitive products.  Of course, some of these 
resources must be transported across the border to be utilized for production in a border 
town.  Thus, a certain degree of cross-border mobility of productive inputs is required 
for the birth and growth of a border industry.  The relations between degrees of 
economic integration and growth and decline of border industry will be examined later. 
 
3.2.   Cross-Border Infrastructure Services 
In East Asia, service link costs —costs for connecting remotely located production 
blocks—  have been reduced substantially.  This made it possible for multinational 7 
 
corporations (MNCs) to aggressively exploit wage differences between developed and 
less developed economies in East Asia and to develop extensive production and 
distribution networks in the region. 
However, CLM countries, less developed Southeast Asian economies, have yet to 
be integrated into such networks in spite of their abundant, reasonably well-educated 
and low-waged labor force.  Underdeveloped infrastructure, notably in transportation 
and communication, hinders them from participating in production and distribution 
networks and, unless good infrastructure is developed, the savings in labor costs by 
relocating labor-intensive activities to less developed economies are more than offset by 
increases in service link costs and other costs (fixed costs of setting up new factories, 
high utility service costs, etc.).  Particularly in labor-intensive export sectors, high 
transport costs could easily wipe out export profitability even if wage levels fell 
substantially (Fujimura, 2006: 52).  We should note that the industrial sector of CLM 
economies is, and will be for a foreseeable future, highly dependent on labor-intensive 
industries. 
Here, a border industry could offer a solution for overcoming such a problem. 
Namely, a less developed economy in Southeast Asia can participate in the production 
network via border areas.    The required infrastructure investment to connect its border 
areas with the existing infrastructure in neighboring countries may be far smaller than 
that for developing a nationwide infrastructure system.    For example, it would be very 
costly to construct a deep-sea port somewhere on the Myanmar coast.  Furthermore, 
the new port may not be fully utilized because of the weak agglomeration of industries, 
and it may lead to a shortage of cargoes and expensive shipping costs.  Firms in 
Myanmar-Thai border areas, on the other hand, can gain access to the well-developed 8 
 
Bangkok Port and Laemg Chabang Port via well-connected road networks in Thailand. 
In border areas, firms would also have better access to utility services such as 
electricity, water, and telecommunications that are provided by  more  advanced 
neighboring countries.    Thus firms located in border areas can enjoy all the benefits of   
lower service link costs (i.e. lower transport and communication costs) and more 
reliable and cheaper utility services (especially electricity) as well as lower labor costs. 
 
3.3.   Economic Integration and Border Barriers 
The above two production factors —lower service link costs and more reliable and 
cheaper utility services— provide location advantages of the border areas over other 
regions, including  metropolitan areas and cities.  Figure 1 shows the relationship 
between the service link costs and the growth of border industry.    Initially, the borders 
of CLMV countries were closed for all practical purposes during the socialist period, 
and thus border industry could not emerge (the first stage).  In this stage, only illegal, 
irregular and small-scale cross-border smuggling was conducted. 
The open-door policy of CLMV and peace in the border areas following the end of 
the Cold War improved security and lowered border barriers, allowing a border industry 
to emerge and develop (the second stage).   A border industry grows rapidly due to the 
location advantages mentioned above, i.e., lower service link costs, more reliable and 
cheaper utility services, and an abundant and cheap labor force. 
However, as the infrastructure develops in a less developed economy, the location 
advantages of border areas (or the competitiveness of border industry) diminish (the 
third stage).  This is because, on the one hand, the development of infrastructure, 
especially in transportation, telecommunications, electricity, and water, reduces the 9 
 
service link costs and utility service costs within the territory and therefore diminishes 
the cost advantages of border areas.  At the same time, the advantages of other areas, 
especially metropolitan areas, may become more important at this stage.    Metropolitan 
areas, for example, can provide a highly qualified labor force and specialized parts and 
service suppliers as well as lucrative local market.  The metropolitan area can also 
furnish more frequent and cheaper transport services.   Such agglomeration effects will 
become crucially important as the industrial activities in the area are upgraded, shifting 
from labor-intensive to capital- and/or knowledge-intensive activities.  As a result of 
lower service link and utility service costs, the economies of agglomeration in the 
metropolitan area will finally eclipse the initial location advantages of the border 
industry and eventually retard its growth. 
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4.    Case Studies of Border Industries 
 
As case studies, this section examines the garment industry in Mae Sot
2
4.1.   Garment Industry in Thai-Myanmar Border Areas 
, which is 
an emerging border industry on the Thai-Myanmar border and SEZs in Cambodia.  
Based upon the discussion mentioned above, this section examines existing cases to see 
how the border industry exploits their location advantages. 
 
Mae Sot is a small town in Tak Province north of Thailand.
3
According to the IDE-ERTC joint survey
  A small river called 
the Moei separates Mae Sot and Myawaddy, a small town in Karen State in Myanmar. 
The two towns are also situated on the GMS’s East-West Economic Corridor that 
connects Da Nang in Vietnam and Mawlamyine in Myanmar via Lao PDR  and 
Thailand. 
4
                                                   
2  This case is based on Kudo (2007) and ERTC (2007).   
3  The population of Mae Sot in 2000 was 106,413 according to Wikipedia (available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mae_Sot), accessed on September 11, 2008. 
4  The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO) conducted a joint study with the Economic 
Research and Training Center (ERTC) of Thammasat University on the economic and social aspects 
of migrant workers in the garment industry in the Thai-Myanmar border areas in August and 
September 2006.    The study included a questionnaire survey covering 10 garment factories and 100 
Myanmar migrant workers.    See ERTC (2007) for details. 
, the garment industry in Mae Sot is quite 
young.  Six out of 10 garment firms surveyed were established after 2001, while two 
were set up in 1998, and one firm in 1990 and 1995, respectively.    The average number 
of employees was 423.    Workers from Myanmar comprised 86% of the total number of 




4.1.1.    Location Advantage (1): Availability of Myanmar Migrant Workers 
An obvious location advantage of garment industry of Mae Sot is availability of 
Myanmar migrant workers.  Tak Province is one of the places where abundant 
Myanmar labor is available and employable.  In terms of the number of work permits 
issued to Myanmar nationals in 2004, Tak Province with 50,932 permits ranked third, 
following Bangkok with 98,308 and Samut Sakhon with 67,799 (Huguet and Punpuing, 
2005: 30-34).
5
Out of 100 Myanmar workers interviewed, 61 were female.  The average age of 
the workers was 27 years old, ranging from the youngest at 18 to the oldest at 36 years 
old. In terms of their hometowns, 23 were from Myawaddy; 20 were from Pa-an, the 
capital of Karen State; 11 were from Mawlamyine, the capital of Mon State; nine were 
from Yangon, the former national capital; six were from Thaton, the former center of the 
ancient Mon Kingdom; and four were from Bago, the capital of Bago Division.
 
6
Seventy-four out of 100 Myanmar workers migrated to Thailand after 2002.    In the 
  Many 
of workers were understandably from nearby towns like Myawaddy and Pa-an.  It is 
however notable that quite a few were from rather distant places like Yangon and Bago 
and, in terms of ethnicity, 96 workers were Burmese and the rest were Karen, Kachin 
and Akha.    These facts imply that the labor market for the garment industry in Mae Sot 
encompasses quite a large geographical area along the main road that connects 
Myawaddy and Yangon. 
                                                   
5  The Thai government has responded to requests from employers to allow them to hire foreign 
workers to fill labor shortages in the industry in particular job areas commonly referred to as the 
“Three Ds”, which stand for “difficult, dirty, and dangerous”.  Following a Thai Cabinet Decision 
in April 2004, the most comprehensive registration until then took place in that year when the Thai 
Ministry of the Interior registered 1,280,000 foreigners during the month of July.    Of these, 814,000 
had applied for work permits by mid-December.  Of the 814,000 applicants, 610,000 or 
three-quarters were from Myanmar. 
6  Some places indicated by interviewees were not identified because of incorrect transliteration of 
the Myanmar language by Thai enumerators. 12 
 
years 2004 and 2005 in particular, the entry of 25 and 27 persons, respectively, was 
recorded.  Rapid increases in these two years may be related to the relaxation of the 
Thai government’s policy on migrant workers.  It may also be related to the collapse of 
Yangon’s garment industry after the United States’ sanctions of July 2003, which 
banned imports of made-in-Myanmar  products to the United States.  The garment 
factories in Yangon were closed and some of their workers came to the factories in Mae 
Sot. 
Employees worked for eight hours a day, six days a week.  Ninety-two workers 
earned only the minimum wage of 143 baht (equivalent to US$3.80 at the exchange rate 
of September 2006) a day, six workers earned 150 baht per day and two workers earned 
160 baht or more per day.  Their basic monthly wage amounted to 3,575 baht (143 
baht/day x 25 days) or US$94, while garment workers in Yangon earned, on average, 
17,800 kyat per month, equivalent to about US$20 per month in 2004 (Kudo, 2005). 
Most workers in Mae Sot also received overtime pay with the higher rates being 23-27 
baht per hour (equivalent to 184-216 baht per day).  Nominal wage differences 
between the garment industry in Yangon and in Mae Sot were almost five-fold, and this 
wage gap attracted workers from Myanmar even from distant places.  This indicates 
that as long as there is a significant difference in wages, border areas will be able to 
attract workers from other areas and make up for the shortage of the labor force in the 
remote area.  Thus, the availability of Myanmar migrant workers in Mae Sot is an 
obvious location advantages of border areas. 
 
4.1.2.    Location Advantages (2): Logistics 
The garment industry in Mae Sot, and possibly Myawaddy in the future, has an 13 
 
advantage in logistics over Yangon.  Let the author take an example case where a 
garment manufacturer in Mae Sot exports to Tokyo.  The 490-kilometer road 
connecting Mae Sot and Bangkok is paved well, and vehicles can cover the distance in 
12 hours at a cost of about US$290 (Table 1).  In Bangkok and its suburbs, there are 
two major ports: one is Klong Toey Port and the other is Laem Chabang Port, the latter 
of which is one of Asia’s leading ports and the most important commercial deep-sea 
port in Thailand.  It takes eight to nine days from Laem Chabang Port to 
Tokyo/Yokohama Port and costs US$1,340 to ship a 40-foot container.
7
Route 
  Products 
made in Mae Sot arrive in Tokyo in about 10 days at an approximate cost of US$1,630. 
 
Table 1.    Comparison between Road and Marine Transport 





  1.Bangkok-Mae Sot  490  12 Hrs (1
st Day)  290  Very Good 
2. Mae Sot-Kawkareik  75  4 Hrs (2
nd Day)    Very Good 
3. Kawkareik-Yangon  380  15 Hrs (3
rd Day)  440  Good 







  1.Bangkok-Bangkok Port  20-30  1-2 Hrs  80  Very Good 
2.Bangkok Port-Yangon Port  Approx. 4000  20 Days  1,000  - 
3.Yangon Port-Yangon  20-30  1-2 Hrs  50  Good 
Total  -  Approx. 1 M  1,130   
Note:  Costs for 20ft container. 
Source:  JETRO Censor (in Japanese), February 2006, p.18. 
 
Alternatively, let the author consider another example case where a garment 
manufacturer in Yangon exports to Tokyo.    Most factories in Yangon have good access 
to Yangon Port, taking one or two hours, at an approximate cost of US$50.   However, 
no vessels sail directly to Japan and cargoes have to be transshipped at Singapore Port. 
It takes four to five days and costs US$650 to ship a 40-foot container from Yangon Port 
                                                   




The garment industry in Mae Sot also has an advantage in the procurement of raw 
materials.  The survey shows that four out of the eight respondent firms used only Thai 
domestic raw materials.    For one respondent, domestic materials accounted for 73% of 
materials with the remaining 27% imported, and three used imported materials only. 
Conversely, the garment industry in Yangon has been completely dependent on 
imported raw materials.  Firms in the garment industry actually needed to import all 
materials—fabrics, accessories, thread, and even plastic bags—with the exception, 
perhaps, of cardboard boxes.  Furthermore, it takes a lengthy period of time in 
Myanmar to import materials.  Thus garment firms in Yangon need a longer lead time 
  Moreover, only two vessels are available every three days, and 
transshipment takes at least another day.  Shipment from Singapore to 
Tokyo/Yokohama Port takes seven days and costs US$940.  In total, it takes 13 days 
from Yangon to Tokyo and costs US $1,740, plus transshipment charges in Singapore 
Port. 
It is obvious that the latter route takes more time and expense by a significant 
margin.  Moreover, garment firms in Yangon need to apply for export and import 
licenses for each transaction and it requires them to travel all the way to Naypyidaw, the 
new capital of Myanmar, located about 300 kilometers north of Yangon.  It usually 
takes about two weeks to obtain one export and/or import license, as the Trade Policy 
Council approves each license individually.  At the same time, cargoes are often kept 
in port for a considerable time for inspection and customs clearance.  On the other 
hand, Bangkok Port and Laem Chabang Port are said to provide much more efficient 
services. 
                                                   
8  Interview with the MGMA chairman on September 4, 2007. 15 
 
for production and the delivery of products.  The longer lead time required hinders 
Myanmar’s garment industry from sewing seasonal and/or fashion apparel items, which 
require quick responses.  On the other hand, it is a strong advantage for garment 
factories in Mae Sot to be able to use both domestic and foreign raw materials. 
 
4.1.3.    Location Advantages (3): Cross-border Supply of Electricity 
Myanmar has experienced a long-standing national power shortage since the late 
1990s.  Shortage of electricity is one of the most serious problems in the garment 
industry as well as in other manufacturing sectors in Myanmar.  In a survey of the 
garment industry in Yangon conducted by the author in 2005, firms were asked to rate 
how severely the poor infrastructure services in telecommunications, transportation, and 
electricity affected their operations.    Table 2 shows that electricity is regarded as a very 
severe problem in garment production. In the same survey, 69 firms among the 139 
respondents answered that they had experienced power interruptions more than three 
times a day and that these had often lasted for more than three hours.    Therefore, most 
manufacturers (134 out of 141 factories) had to use their own generators or share 
generators with other factories. 
 
Table 2.    Garment Factories’ Ratings on Infrastructure Services in Yangon, 2005. 







Obstacle  No Problem 
Telecommunications  3  18  30  34  56 
Electricity  53  55  17  8  8 
Transportations  0  2  20  35  84 
Source:    Kudo (2006: 113). 16 
 
On the other hand, firms in Mae Sot are provided with power from a Thai company 
and therefore have  a reliable electricity supply.  Moreover, many households in 
Myawaddy already buy electricity from a Thai company in Mae Sot, which is however 
deemed illegal by the State-owned Economic Enterprises Law in 1989.    The Myanmar 
consumers pay electricity charges in baht, the use of which is also illegal, as possession 
of foreign currency by Myanmar citizens is prohibited by law. 
The provision of electricity to households in Myawaddy through the power grid in 
Mae Sot seems to be based on a mutual understanding between the regional authorities 
in both countries.   Once legal and institutional arrangements have been made between 
the two governments, factories located in Myawaddy could be officially and regularly 
provided with electricity from the Thai side.    The electricity supply from the Thai side 
to the Myanmar side shall be a significant location advantage of Myawaddy over major 
cities in Myanmar proper including Yangon. 
 
4.2.   Manhattan SEZ in Cambodia 
The Cambodian government approved 18 SEZs in the nation as of November 2007, 
and many of them are located along the border areas (See Map 1).    One of the earliest 
established SEZs in Cambodia is Manhattan SEZ, which is located in a small border 
town called Bavet, opposite Moc Bai of Vietnam.  The cross-border gate between 
Bavet and Moc Bai is on the GMS’s Southern Economic Corridor that connects 
Bangkok of Thailand and Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam through Phnom Phenh of Cambodia. 
Two factories started to operate and export their products to the rest of the world 
through Vietnam.  The factories can employ Cambodian workers with the minimum 
wage of US$ 50 per month, which is cheaper than that of Ho Chi Minh and its suburbs. 17 
 
On the other hand, electricity is supplied to the factories from the Vietnam grid, which 
is cheaper and more reliable than that of Cambodia.  The products can be transported 
to Ho Chi Minh Port, which is located just 60 km away from the Bavet-Moc Bai border. 
Ho Chi Minh Port is one of the well-developed international ports and has a good access 
to the regional and global markets.    The machineries and intermediate goods necessary 
for production also can be supplied from Ho Chi Minh and its suburbs, which have 
relatively thicker industrial clusters than Phnom Penh. 
 
Map 1.    SEZs in Cambodia (as of November, 2007) 
 
Note:  In this map, only 16 SEZs are shown. 
Source:  Documents obtained from the Cambodian SEZ Board (CSEZB) on November 16, 2007. 
 18 
 
Thus, firms in Manhattan SEZ can make the most of its location advantages of 
border areas between the less developed region (Cambodia) and the more developed 
region (Southern Vietnam).  It is noteworthy that most of SEZ developers in Cambodia 
are private companies, and present and potential investors in those SEZs are also private 
firms.  The private sector and the public sector find business and investment 
opportunities in border areas, and regard border areas as a competitive location. 
 
 
5.    Why is Border Industry not located  in Less Developed 
Economies? 
 
The border industry is, in theory, expected to be geographically located in the less 
developed economy.    In terms of physical service link costs that are largely determined 
by geographical distance, it makes no difference on which side of the border firms are 
located.  Infrastructure services such as electricity, telecommunications, and access to 
international ports and airports can be provided from advanced neighbors.  Access to 
intermediate goods is also provided by suppliers located in the neighbors. 
However, a border industry could enjoy the benefits of lower labor costs much more 
if it is situated in the less developed economy.    In the case of garment industry in Mae 
Sot, factories could employ more workers at lower wages on the Myanmar side of the 
border areas than on the Thai side, as they do not need to follow the minimum wage 
regulations and restrictive migrant worker policies established by the Thai government. 
Nevertheless, it is particularly surprising that no border industry is located on the 
Myanmar side.  In the case of the Thai-Myanmar border area, as we have examined, all 
factories are located on Thai soil, and Myanmar migrant laborers move to Thailand and 19 
 
work there.  This is obviously due to insufficient investment and an inferior business 
environment in Myanmar where many restrictive regulations, both explicit and implicit, 
are imposed on foreign firms by the host government.  For example, Myanmar’s 
Foreign Investment Law sets the minimum capital investment at US$500,000 for 
manufacturing firms, and such an amount is often more than Thai small and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) can afford.
9
On the contrary, SEZs in the border areas of Cambodia are located on the 
 
Moreover, lack of policy consistency and unpredictability of policy implementation 
and sporadic closure of border gates seriously impede Thai firms from crossing the 
Moei River.  The Myanmar government also strictly controls external trade, 
particularly cross-border trade, by means of export and import licenses, an export-first 
policy and trade bans on certain items.  It also restricts foreign currency transactions, 
which then create significant disparities in exchange rates from the official rate of about 
six kyat to one US dollar to the market rate of about 1000 kyat as of February 2009. 
The Myanmar government frequently changes rules and regulations without prior 
consultation with the business sector or even without prior notice and this attitude 
seriously undermines the stability and predictability of business environment in 
Myanmar.  Such unfavorable government policies increase the institution-wise service 
link costs across the Thai-Myanmar border. If enterprises were to move to the Myanmar 
side, Thai investors would face an uncertain business environment.    In the border areas, 
divisions  are created not by the distance but by the impermeability of borders and 
differences in business and investment environments.  Thus, Thai firms in the border 
area would not choose to move to Myanmar soil. 
                                                   
9  Nevertheless, the minimum capital for foreign investors is not written in either Myanmar’s 
Foreign Investment Law or its related documents. 20 
 
Cambodian side rather than on the Thai or Vietnam side.  This is probably because 
investment and business environment in Cambodia is relatively better than that of 
Myanmar.  Moreover, regional economic cooperation schemes, such as the GMS, 
contribute to the development of cross-border infrastructure, cross-border institutional 
frameworks such as the cross-border transport agreement (CBTA), single-window and 
single-stop services, and truck passports.  These efforts will reduce the transport and 
transaction costs across the border and strengthen the location advantages of border 
areas on the side of less developed economies. 
 
 
6.    Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
This paper examined the location advantages of border areas, in particular of those 
between less developed regions such as CLMV and more developed regions such as 
Thailand and China.  We identified several factors that promote location advantages of 
border areas and growth potential of border industry.    The border industry has a growth 
potential, as it can exploit the location advantages of abundant and cheap labor force in 
less developed regions, while avoiding high service link costs and unstable utility 
services that accrue from underdeveloped infrastructure in less developed regions, by 
utilizing cross-border infrastructure services from the more developed side. 
What policy recommendations can we draw from the discussions above? The 
CLMV economies have not been deeply integrated into the East Asian production and 
distribution networks in spite of their various location advantages, notably abundant, 
reasonably well-educated and low-waged labor forces.    Underdeveloped infrastructure, 21 
 
logistics in particular, and poor investment climate hinder them from participating in 
such networks in East Asia.    Service link costs and other business costs in CLMV have 
not become low enough to realize total costs reduction.  Such costs can easily offset 
the advantages of low-waged workers in CLMV countries.  Instead, the workers of 
CLMV go and work in foreign countries, Thailand in particular. 
Special economic zones (SEZs), including export processing zones (EPZs), could 
be a good policy tool to reduce such business and transaction costs embedded in the 
CLMV economies.  SEZs will provide well-developed infrastructure with intensive 
capital investments in the demarcated production sites.  SEZs will also provide 
efficient administrative procedures including single-stop and single-window services for 
export and import, business services such as offshore banking and logistics, and 
governmental supports for human resources development and technological transfer.  
All these efficient services will be made possible in SEZs by insulating them from the 
rest of the country, where investment climate is generally poor. 
SEZs can be located in the border areas, since border industry can offer a solution 
on how to overcome high business and service-link costs in the CLMV economies. 
SEZs located in the border areas can connect themselves to the regional and global 
economy through their borders with neighboring countries, Thailand in particular, which 
have logistic hubs such as deep sea ports, airports, and trunk roads.  Thus, firms 
including multi-national companies (MNCs) located in the border areas of CLMV can 
enjoy location advantages such as low-waged labor while realizing total cost reduction 
with lower service link costs.  SEZs in the border areas also can provide efficient 
cross-border infrastructure and institutions, which eventually enhance the 
competitiveness of border areas. 22 
 
In this way, border areas in CLMV are no longer backward regions that are 
dependent on assistance from the center.  On the contrary, they are situated on the 
frontiers and are conduits which capture business opportunities originating from 
emerging countries such as Thailand and China, and pass them into the core of the 
CLMV economies.  The governments of CLMV countries need to recognize the 
potential of border areas and to position border area development, including promotion 
of border industry, in their national industrial development strategy. 23 
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